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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 17/05/2006 Accident number: 175 
Accident time: 08:00 Accident Date: 05/12/1996 
Where it occurred: Road 696, Banteay 
Meanchey Province 
Country: Cambodia 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: CMAC 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded) Ground condition: bushes/scrub 
electromagnetic 
grass/grazing area 
Date record created: 14/02/2004 Date  last modified: 14/02/2004 
No of victims: 2 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate equipment (?) 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 





At the time of the accident the demining group operated in a two-man drill whereby one 
deminer used the detector and marked any signals while the other looked for tripwires, cut 
undergrowth and excavated any detector readings. A third deminer may have been resting [it 
is believed that the group operated in three-man teams at this time]. 
This accident was recorded as having occurred on 6th December 1996 on the country MAC 
Accident summary sheet. An internal UN controlled demining group report (in Khmer) was 
found on file in January 1999. The following summarises its content. 
The demining team were clearing land so that an NGO could build a road. There was a 
deserted house at the site. The area was densely vegetated and strewn with a large number 
of fragments. Victim No.1 was a detector man. His partner cleared some vegetation and then 
returned to the rest area. Victim No.1 tested the detector a second time and went to sweep 
the area.  
At 8:00 the Team Leader heard an explosion and ran towards it. He stated that he saw Victim 
No.2 on his back about 15m away from the accident site. He carried Victim No.1 to a safe 
area where the medic treated them. Both victims were then taken to Aranyaprathet Hospital in 
Thailand, arriving 40 minutes later. The Team Leader returned to the accident site and found 
the detector making a constant noise.  
Victim No.2 was a supervisor who was inspecting the work. The report gave no further details 
but states that the nature of his injuries indicated that he was close to the prodder man at the 
time of the accident and then walked to a point 15m away. 
The investigators went to the site and found a crater inside the clearance lane measuring 
15cm wide and 4cm deep. Around the crater were metal fragments, including four nails 50cm 
in front, but there was no evidence that they had been investigated by the victim.  
The victim's detector was slightly damaged but was able to be tested, and it was found that it 
was not working. The detector was sent to Schiebel for further tests to determine the fault, but 
at the time of compiling the report, no result was known. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 222 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: US$4,000 Time to hospital: 40 minutes 
Protection issued: Safety spectacles Protection used: not recorded 
 




Leg Below knee 
Leg Below knee 
COMMENT 




A medical report recorded that the accident occurred at 08:00 and the two victims were first 
taken to Aranyaprathet Hospital in Thailand where they were stabilised, and then transferred 
to Mongkul Borey Provincial Hospital the following day, arriving at 17:00. 
Victim No.1 suffered traumatic amputation of both feet and had a large wound on the 
underside of his wrist, as indicated on the medical sketch reproduced below. 
 
He left hospital on 18th December 1996 but was scheduled to return for another operation on 
20th February 1997. In the meantime the victim would continue to receive treatment at the 
country MAC's clinic.  
He was awarded $4,000 compensation on 17th March 1997, and received it on 29th April 
1997.  




Victim number: 223 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: none Time to hospital: 40 minutes 
Protection issued: Safety spectacles Protection used: not recorded 
 








See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
A medical report recorded that the accident occurred at 08:00 and the two victims were first 
taken to Aranyaprathet Hospital in Thailand where they were stabilised, and then transferred 
to Mongkul Borey Provincial Hospital the following day, arriving at 17:00. 
Victim No.2 suffered an 8cm gash across the bicep of the left arm, minor multiple fragment 
injuries to his face and his eyes were filled with dust and sand. The prognosis was that he 
would probably recover fully but that it was too early to be sure about his eyes.  
He left hospital on 11th December 1996, fully recovered, and the doctor recommended that he 
be allowed to return to work. 
At a Compensation Board meeting on 17th March 1997 it was decided to allow Victim No.2 to 
return to work but not to award him compensation  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the field 
supervisors failed to ensure that the equipment issued was working adequately and allowed 
safety distances to be breached. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment” 
because the detector was not working. 
The report contained no record of whether the safety spectacles were worn, but in the case of 
Victim No.2 (who was at some distance from the blast) this seems unlikely.  
There is some evidence of a management failing by virtue of the detectors having been 
known for some time to be inadequate. 
The question of punishing Victim No.2 by not paying compensation deserves note. The victim 
had paid out of his own salary into a compensation fund and was injured while working. The 
responsibility for field discipline rested with the field supervisors and he was one, but the 
official punishment of victims in this manner is unique to this demining group.  
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